Slavery in the “DNR” and “LNR”

Inaugural Congress of the Federation of Trade Unions of the Donetsk People’s Republic, 21 February 2015

The report below appeared under the title above on the Facebook page of the Ukrainian association Liva Opozytsiya – Left Opposition https://www.facebook.com/liva.opozicya (accessed 24 February 2015). Tranlation by Marko Bojcun

The Federation of Trade Unions of the “DNR” (Donetsk People’s Republic) http://www.osps.dn.ua/ was formed this weekend amidst all the pomp and circumstance reminiscent of the era of stagnation (the Brezhnev years – MB). Of course, at the core of this rotten formation are the bureaucrats of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (FPU). Loyal to the Ukrainian oligarchs the FPU has agreed to be their instrument of control over the workers in the territories seized by the separatists. So now we can stop thinking about the development of an independent trade union movement in these “people’s” republics. The Independent Miners Union at the Barakov mine has already come up against the force of the Instruction “about the prohibition of registration of independent unions” (http://npg.social/title/275/).

The draft Law of the “DNR” entitled “On trade unions, their rights and guaranteed activities” contains obstacles in the way of independent trade unions: it is forbidden to form a trade union if it has less than 50 members. Apart from that, there is no recognition that a trade union becomes one from the moment its statutes are adopted.

Freedom of expression is restricted: according to the “DNR” law any mass media outlet can have its license withdrawn for mentioning a “prohibited” organisation. One needs to get state registration in order to distribute a newspaper with a print run of more than 100 (one hundred) copies.

“There are no independent trade unions in the LNR (Luhansk People’s Republic) nor will there be” confirms Mykola Koziuberda, head of the Independent Miners Union at the Nikanor Nova mine (Luhansk Coal Association). Koziuberda has fled his home because of threats against him (see interview with Koziuberda published in this blog – MB)

Protests in the “DNR” are criminalised: its criminal code punishes slander and insult of government officials.

There is a “Labour Code” being prepared in the DNR which has a clearly pro-capitalist character (http://lug-rescomroo.info/?p=277). Under its demagogy about “a republic without oligarchs” a criminal regime is being formed which not only violates the right to work, but excludes the very possibility of struggle for the rights of labour.

The Luhansk People’s Republic doesn’t need independent unions and registering them is now prohibited

An interview with Mykola Koziuberda , Head of the Independent Union of Miners at the Nikanor Nova mine of the Luhansk Coal Association.

The interview was taken on 24 February 2015 by Oleh Vernyk, Head of the All Ukrainian Independent Union Defense of Labour- Zakhyst Pratsi. Translation by Marko Bojcun

 

O.V. Mykola, we have received information that you had to leave Luhansk Oblast because of direct threats made on your life. Is that true?

M.K. Yes, its true. Right now I’m staying in Poltava Oblast. I have to say that several threats were made on my life, including from officials of the LNR (Luhansk People’s Republic). These threats were linked directly to my activities as leader of the independent miners union at the Nikanor Nova mine.

O.V. Tell us a little about the situation at your mine, how things have developed there.

M.K. The director of the mine issued an order on 27 July 2014 to stop work at our mine. Approximately 300 people were left with full time jobs out of 1500 miners and support staff. The miners at our mine haven’t been paid since August 2014. The bank cards into which our miners get their pay have been blocked. In February this year the accounts office at the mine paid out one month’s wages – for last November. That’s all we’ve gotten up till now.

During this time the Nikanor Nova mine is one of a very few belonging to the Luhansk Coal Association which hasn’t stopped working and has suffered practically no damage from the war in Luhansk. The mine produces coal for electricity generating stations, which is needed by everyone regardless of the current position of the front.

 O.V. A few words about your independent union?

M.K. We were officially registered in the town of Zorynsk, Luhansk oblast on 14 April 2000. At the peak of our growth our independent miners union had over 600 members, that is approximately half of the work collective belonged to it.

We experienced heavy repression from the mine management over the years after we were formed. Workers received bonuses and the best times for leave on the condition they resigned from our independent union. Our union committee adopted resolutions many times calling for the removal of the mine director from his post in connection with frequent violations of the labour code. However, all our attempts were stopped by the Ministry and the law enforcement authorities. Eventually we succeeding in getting the resignation of the director who had by then become completely shameless. But the situation did not change in a qualitative way after that.

By the summer of 2014 there were 220 members left in our independent union.

O.V. Mykola, scanned copies of documents appeared on the Internet recently which testify to the prohibition of registration of independent trade unions in the LNR.

In particular the Independent Miners Union at the M.P. Barakov mine belonging to the Krasnodon Coal Association has put up onto its site (http://npg.social/title/275/  ) a scanned copy of its correspondence with the official organs of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” in which they are refused registration on the grounds of the Instruction of the LNR Minister of Justice A.V. Shubina, dated 20/1/2015: No. 8 – OD “On the prohibition of registration of independent trade unions on the territory of the Luhansk People’s Republic”.

This material evoked a strong civic reaction in the trade union milieu of Ukraine, in Europe and around the world. A number of “left wing” publications which support the DNR and LNR projects have been quick to declare these documents are “fakes”. Can you comment on this situation?

M.K. This is all true and the document is genuine. Moreover, I have personal experience of the leaders of the LNR not even wanting to hear anything about a social dialogue with independent trade unions. They rule out the very possibility of forming such unions in the LNR.

For example, in my capacity as head of the Independent Miners Union at the Nikanor Nova mine I met with Ihor Plotnycky, the LNR leader on 5 November 2014. I wanted to find out how the LNR leadership views the issue of co-operation between the government and the independent unions. Plotnytsky gave me no understandable reply, but advised me to meet and consult on this question with Oleh Akimov, Head of the so-called “Federation of Trade Unions of the LNR”.

This “federation” was formed with the support of the LNR authorities on the basis of the Luhansk Oblast Section of the so-called “official” unions – the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (FPU). During my meeting with Mr Akimov I was told that independent unions had nothing in common and even more so today they have nothing in common with his “Federation of Trade Unions of LNR”.

That same day, 5 November 2014, I was told point blank the following during my meeting with Dmytro Leonidovych Liamin, LNR Minister for Fuel, Energy and Coal industry, a man I have known for many years:

“We don’t need rebels, and you are a well known rebel (buntar) and you are just trouble”…..I will come to you and rip your head off”.

At this meeting I was told clearly and in no uncertain terms that there is only one official trade union in the LNR: the “Federation of Trade Unions of the LNR” and no others. Therefore, they are not going to register independent trade unions.

After Debaltseve: government and volunteer battalions seek different military solutions

Semen Semenchenko

The debacle at Debaltseve in the days following the Minsk II accords has given rise to two major developments: the Ukrainian government is seeking a European Union police mission to help it hold the line against the separatists and their Russian backers; and seventeen volunteer battalions have established a joint leadership and headquarters to make them a more effective fighting force. Both developments stem from the same recognition of the military inferiority of the Ukrainian side facing an adversary that is ready and willing to press forward into new territory. Both developments pose a military solution to this inferiority. But they differ insofar as the first seeks more external support to correct the military imbalance while the second seeks domestic changes to do the same thing.

The military solution from within

The announcement of a new joint leadership came from Semen Semenchenko, leader of the Donbas volunteer battalion, People’s Deputy elected to the Verkhovna Rada and deputy chairperson of the Rada’s Committee on National Security and Defense. In a series of posts on his Facebook on February 18 and 19 https://www.facebook.com/dostali.hvatit?fref=ts Semenchenko reported first on the difficult exit of Ukrainian troops from the Debaltseve encirclement, that an initial 167 wounded were taken to Artemivsk, and that “many dead” were left behind. He then fiercely criticised the military and political leadership for the debacle:

“This is not evidence of Russian superiority, but of mass heroism of the people’s army and the volunteer battalions and the gross incompetence, if not more, of the top leaders of the army.

What went wrong in Debaltseve? The same as before. We had enough forces and resources. The problem lay in the command and co-ordination. They were not up to the mark. There is a lack of personal responsibility. Simply stated, Muzhenko must go (Viktor Muzhenko, Chief of Staff and Commander of the Armed Forces). In the footsteps of Heletey (Colonel General, Minister of Defense from July to October 2014) …The Chief of Staff should be brought to justice…

The second problem concerns lying. If you utter a white lie in war time to save people’s lives or to prevent panic, then its admissible. But if you lie to save your own ass, its unacceptable. People are paying for that with their lives. We pay.

Donetsk Airport – a lie. Ilovaysk – a lie. Uhlehirsk – a lie. Lohvinove – a lie. That Donestsk airport and Debaltseve have no strategic significance – lies.”

On the following morning, February 19, Semenchenko gave his reaction to Poroshenko’s press conference about the evacuation from Debaltseve, comparing Poroshenko’s claims about its well organised character and the modest level of casualties and fatalities to the more damning reports he was receiving from officers and soldiers coming out of the encirclement. He insisted that Poroshenko was deliberately misinformed about Debaltseve, that he was the victim of

“fakes concocted specially for the President…produced and distributed by a narrow group of people trying to protect their influence over the president despite all their mistakes, failures and crimes…..They deceive you about the number of dead…of wounded…of the real level of co-ordination of the army…they deceive you when they report the capture of settlements that have in fact not been captured”.

The leaders of 17 volunteer battalions have decided to establish their own joint leadership and headquarters because of the incompetence, corruption and treason they see taking place in the highest ranks of the armed forces command and the intelligence services. (on treason see: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/02/19/7059184/ ). The battalion commanders hold these people above all as responsible for the series of military defeats suffered from IIovaysk to Debaltseve, and they can no longer trust them to send their volunteers into battle. The battalions’ own joint leadership wants to filter, evaluate and inform such orders before obeying them.

The new leadership is headquartered in Dnipropetrovsk and has appointed an initial staff of 35 people.

They insist that the headquarters for the volunteer battalions is not a parallel or alternative or competing authority to that of the Armed Forces General Staff, but rather a supplementary institution that will maintain discipline of its forces, organise better their provision, co-ordinate their military resources and operations, provide additional sources of intelligence from the field and advise the Armed Forces General Staff. The volunteer battalions, they say, will obey the Armed Forces command and carry out its orders.

Equally important, the new headquarters will offer an independent channel of intelligence and advice to the President, in effect an alternative to what he already gets from the state institutions.

Immediately after the joint leadership and headquarters were announced, Ukrayinska Pravda http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2015/02/19/7059155/ published statements from several battalion commanders and paramilitary group leaders declining to take part in the initiative. They said that it challenged the authority of the armed forces command and undermined the unity of the forces themselves. Semenchenko responded to what he saw as “the wild hysteria” generated in social media by the announcement by insisting their joint leadership will not compete with the armed forces command, it is not intended to put pressure on the president, nor will it conduct its own separate war.

The volunteer military movement is splitting under the pressure of these developments. Some whole battalions as well as separate units breaking away from their battalions are going over. So there is a new crack opening up in the already fragile unity of the military forces. It has arisen directly in response to defeats they suffered in the field that battalion leaders and the rank and file attribute to the incompetence, corruption and treason at work inside the military, political and bureaucratic echelons of the Ukrainian state. The army is a microcosm of society and the same view about what’s wrong with the Ukrainian state is widespread today across civil society as well. It is most evident at the intersection between civilian and military life: in the growing evasion of and even resistance to conscription http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/hto-zrivaye-mobilizaciyu-v-ukrayini-_.html .

The military solution from without

The Poroshenko-Yatseniuk coalition government has sought military support from its western allies for some months now. But until last week there were never any requests for foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. When asked on the eve of the Minsk negotiations in February whether his government would accept peace-keeping forces in Ukraine, president Poroshenko declined, arguing instead that all Ukraine needed was to control its own border with Russia and for foreign fighters to leave, and then international peace keepers would be unnecessary. This position changed cardinally after the Debaltseve debacle. A meeting of the Council of National Security and Defense (RNBO) on 18 February took a decision to put to the Verkhovna Rada a proposal to approve an appeal to the European Union and the United Nations to send an EU police mission to patrol two borders – the section of the Russian-Ukrainian border that Ukrainian authorities are prevented from reaching by the separatist forces, and the front line of fighting between the separatists and the Ukrainian forces further to the west.

The proposal is not for a UN peace keeping force because Russia as a member of the UN Security Council can veto such a proposal, or on the other hand insist on Russian peacekeepers taking part in that force. President Putin had said at Minsk that he was not opposed to a UN mission, so presumably Kyiv is already on alert that Russia may wish to strengthen its presence in Eastern Ukraine in such a way, as it did in Georgia with its own “peace keepers”after it won the short August 2008 war. An EU police mission, on the other hand, could not by definition have Russian participation. Kyiv makes this point by saying that Russia as an aggressor state cannot partake in a peacekeeping mission in the same theatre.

The significance of this proposal is twofold. First, it signals Ukrainian leaders’ recognition that they cannot get access to all of their common border with Russia nor can they rely on their own military forces to hold back further advances of the separatist movement. And second, they are prepared to become even more reliant on external support – this time military force – as a counterweight to the challenge posed by the separatist movement and their external backers.

These two major developments of the past week cannot be reconciled. They cannot co-exist and each contribute somehow to strengthen Kyiv’s hand against its adversary. For one, Poroshenko and his close circle of sylovyky will not long tolerate a bifurcated chain of command, especially one that weakens their control over the volunteer battalions, which are their most motivated and battle hardened forces. For another, the European Union will not even contemplate sending any kind of peace keeping or peace-making force into a zone where all sides have not agreed to cease fighting. And there still isn’t sufficient evidence yet that the pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian volunteer battalions want to end the fighting, even if Kyiv and Moscow do now.

The solution cannot rely on military force alone

The wider problem, however, is that greater military capacity from within Ukrainian society or from without cannot on its own prevent further defeats and losses of territory by the Ukrainian side. Unless Russia stops backing the separatists. The current state of the Ukrainian armed forces alone demonstrates quite convincingly that the Ukrainian state’s leaders are also failing on several other critical fronts – ideological, social and economic – to rally the society and put up an effective national resistance to Russian imperialist aggression. The state of Ukraine will survive for some time in some shape or form. But if it proves incapable of defending the right of the Ukrainian people to their national self-determination it will become an even more dependent state – beholden to the West and to Russia. In the long run they could impose a settlement on the Ukrainian people that is based on a common transnational interest that satisfies the ruling classes of Europe, Ukraine and Russia. And that kind of solution would serve rather well some powerful members of the Ukrainian establishment like Rinat Akhmetov, Viktor Medvedchuk and Dmytro Firtash, to name the most likely deal makers.

The Ukrainian people deserve better than that. But where will an effective strategy and leadership of national resistance come from?  And who will embark on a radical transformation of the rotten political, social and economic order, and in a time of war?

Poroshenko announces orderly evacuation from Debaltseve, while Ukrainian soldiers reported breaking out on foot.

Soldiers leaving Debaltseve. Photograph by Anastasia Stanko

(Updated 18.2.2015 at 1300h London time)

President Poroshenko spoke before the cameras on 18 February at Boryspil airport in Kyiv before flying off to the front near Debaltseve. He announced that 80% of all the forces in Debaltseve have been evacuated, with only two more units to come out. He claimed there had been no encirclement, the army units were evacuated in an orderly manner, and that they brought with them their military equipment, including tanks, vehicles and heavy artillery.

Poroshenko further charged separatist and Russian forces with refusing to allow OSCE monitors into Debaltseve so that they could not attest to the readiness of the Ukrainian armed forces there to withdraw their heavy artillery, as agreed under the new Minsk accords. He went on to say that the successful evacuation demonstrated the battle readiness of the armed forces, who had refused to surrender, but had given their opponents “a kick in the teeth” before getting out. A new front line has been established further to the west.

Earlier, in the morning of the same day the following report was published by Hromadske (Community Television) http://www.hromadske.tv/politics/ukrayinski-viiskovi-vikhodyat-iz-debaltsevogo/

Ukrainian soldiers are leaving Debaltseve. The news was reported by journalist Anastasia Stanko, working for Hromadske Television. The troops started leaving at six in the morning. A lot of them are leaving the town on foot along the road to Artemivsk, where they are being picked up by other Ukrainian units.

All of the departing units fought their way out, with their scouts breaking the path for them. Members of the Kryvbas battalion say they haven’t eaten for five days. They were surrounded in Novohryhorivka and were under constant mortar fire. According to them the village “was wiped off the face of the earth”.

…..According to these fighters not all Ukrainian formations have been able to get out of Debaltseve.

Attention has focused for days on the encirclement of several thousand Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve. How could this happen? Who is responsible for allowing it to happen, and why has there been no adequate response or effort to back up the encircled soldiers?

On Tuesday 17 February Semen Semenchenko, Donbas battalion commander and elected parliamentary deputy made an urgent appeal https://www.facebook.com/dostali.hvatit/posts/903690739665701?fref=nf&pnref=story to President Poroshenko to take decisive action to break the encirclement:

The situation in Debaltseve has deteriorated seriously in the past several hours. That which could have been done yesterday can no longer be done today. Any further delay in taking decisive action will prove very costly. Just by maintaining our current positions we won’t achieve our aims, but rather we could come into catastrophe. I cannot for a number of reasons, above all reasons of a military nature, enter into a public discussion about the real balance of forces. I don’t want to conduct an information war with the General Staff and demonstrate who is misinforming society and the Commander-in-Chief (Poroshenko). This is not the time for this, its time to join our forces.

As (Donbas) battalion commander, People’s Deputy and first deputy speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security and Defense I demand decisive action to break the blockade around the ATO forces in the Debaltseve district and to straighten out the front line.

… I appeal to the Commander-in-Chief and ask him to adopt immediately a decision to strike A POWERFUL COUNTER-BLOW against the Russian-terrorist armies, to lead out the encircled forces and to straighten out the front line. The main thing is to preserve the core fighting units. We are ready to implement any order. We will not allow any panic, but the time has come to act.

On the same day the deputy head of the President’s Administration Valeriy Chaliy http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/02/17/7058926/ promised vaguely that there would be “a precise and active” response on Wednesday to the separatists’ violations of the cease fire. Chaliy as was reported to say that the separatist and Russian fighters were trying to prevent the withdrawal of troops planned for 17 February from the front. If he was being reported accurately Chaliy could have been signalling Poroshenko’s readiness to withdraw the Ukrainian forces from Debaltseve, as opposed to a counteroffensive.

According to Dmytro Tymchuk http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/02/18/7058935/ the separatists are concentrating their forces and armour overwhelmingly onto Debaltseve. Ukrainian forces there have been been unable to break out or be supplied from without for six days – i.e. since the day the Minsk II accords were signed.

It would appear that Ukrainian leaders made a big blunder by believing that the separatists and their Russian backers would stop in their tracks and not keep pressing on this strategic transport and communications hub, which they had almost completely encircled already by 13 February. Or that somehow Poroshenko could successfully bring Western diplomatic pressure to bear on Putin to get the separatists to stand down. It quickly became obvious that wouldn’t work.

The separatists of the DNR and LNR are not restrained by either of the agreements they signed in Minsk. Aleksandr Zakharchenko stated the day after the Minsk II agreement that his republic seeks complete independence. He also threatens to widen the war in the direction on Kharkiv.

Although Debaltseve is not mentioned in the Minsk II agreement, it was one of the most bitterly disputed and unresolved issues at the talks. Putin told his interlocutors in Minsk he was fully informed about the situation at Debaltseve; and then at a press conference in Budapest on 17 February he urged Ukrainian leaders “not to prevent the soldiers in the Ukrainian armed forces from laying down their arms”. http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/02/17/7058921/

In the coming hours and days attention will be focused on assessing the evacuation Poroshenko announced at the airport today: what have been the fatalities and casualties in and around Debaltseve; how many troops have left and how many were taken prisoner; and how much of their still intact weapons and equipment did they manage to bring out with them. And what impact do these developments have on securing or scuttling the ceasefire, the planned withdrawal of heavy artillery from the front and the exchange of prisoners of war.

 

Minsk II: Land for a ceasefire, but not for peace

The “Package of measures to implement the Minsk Accords” (see the full text in Russian http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2015/02/12/7058327/ ) agreed in Minsk on 12 February contains thirteen clauses and an explanatory note. Let’s go through them one by one and ask ourselves what they mean.

1. An immediate and comprehensive ceasefire beginning at 00h on 15 February.

A contradiction in terms: one cannot have an immediate ceasefire that will start in three days time. The Russian delegation insisted on this date, arguing that since the negotiations in Minsk extended from Wednesday into Thursday, the originally proposed date for a ceasefire on 14 February should also go over to the next day. The real reason: for the forces of the Donetsk Peoples Republic and Luhansk Peoples Republic to have enough time to capture Debaltseve, which is the hub of ALL electrified rail transport, the railway hub for the coal and steel industries, and the point through which passes the main highway linking Donetsk and Luhansk. With Debaltseve in their hands, in addition to the 500 square kilometres of territory they have taken since September, the DNR and LNR forces have a territory that is more economically viable and a transportation infrastructure through which Russia can supply them.

So the real purpose of this clause is not to have a ceasefire, but a final escalation of the fighting.

2. Beginning at the latest by the second day after the ceasefire and to be completed within 14 days the withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides and the creation of security zones of 50km free of artillery; of 70km free of artillery of 100mm calibre or greater; and 140 km free of tactical missile systems, such as Twister, Hurricane, Tornado. For Ukrainian forces the point from which withdrawal is measured is the present line of hostilities; for the DNR and LNR forces it is the line established by the September 2014 Minsk Accords.

The security zones will be free of artillery and missile systems but not infantry. This means that the separatist forces will control territory up to the present line of hostilities. And the territories on both sides of the border will remain militarised.

3. The OSCE to monitor and verify the ceasefire and withdrawal of weapons.

The OSCE has 350 officers in the region. Together with its support staff the mission totals about 1000 people. The OSCE has acknowledged that it cannot monitor the 500 km border between Russia and Ukraine, that it cannot guarantee its own officers’ safety in many separate parts of the conflict zone and therefore does not even venture into them.

4. Within a day after the ceasefire for a discussion to begin about the modalities for organising under a Law of Ukraine “On the special order of local government in some areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” elections to local government in the affected regions, and for the Verkhovna Rada to confirm in law within 30 days the territories covered by that law within the boundaries established by the September 2014 Minsk Accords.

The law in question, intended to decentralise power and authority to the parts of Donestsk and Luhansk at war with Kyiv, was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) in October last year in fulfilment of one of the conditions of the September 2014 Minsk Accords. The leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics then ignored this law and organised their own referenda and elections according to their own rules, which led President Poroshenko to withdraw the law in question. The question arises: will the DNR and LNR leaders ignore this law again, or take it merely as recognition of their right to autonomy under whatever rules they choose?

Because this clause of the February 12 Package of Measures applies to territories “within the boundaries established by the September 2014 Minsk Accords”, it does not extend to the new territories captured by the separatists since September 2014. So whose law will govern the establishment of local self government in them?

5. The provision of pardons and amnesties by the prohibition of prosecutions against people who have taken part in the events in the affected areas.

This has been a demand of the separatist leaders who foresee themselves exchanging the gun for the briefcase and becoming “normal” politicians and businessmen. They want to feel safe wherever they go. But what about people who have committed war crimes, who have kidnapped, tortured and killed prisoners, both civilian and military? Ukrainian law covering such crimes applies to Ukrainian combatants in the conflict. Why should combatants on the other side be exempted?

6. The release and exchange of all hostages and prisoners of war.

How will people find out what’s happened to members of their own family who are missing? Hostages and prisoners are to be exchanged “all-for-all” within five days of the ceasefire. But then there will be people still looking for lost relatives and friends. Will full lists of captives be published by all sides, including those who died in captivity? Will the Russian government provide a list of its prisoners, its own soldiers missing in action, its own dead soldiers and where they are buried?

7. Provide for the access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian aid in the affected region “on the basis of an international mechanism”.

The long-standing demand of the Ukrainian side is that all humanitarian aid deliveries be supervised by the International Committee of the Red Cross so that such aid does not serve political or military purposes, but is distributed to those in greatest need regardless of their allegiances or place of residence. 

8. The restoration of all socio-economic relations under Ukrainian law, including the payment of pensions and benefits, the timely payment of utility bills and the renewal of taxation.

This clause identifies a necessary requirement to rebuild and reintegrate a war torn region into the wider national economy ands social structure. However, the intention of the leaders of the DNR and LNR is not to integrate, but to separate the territory they control from the rest of Ukraine. So this clause means that the Ukrainian state is committed to devoting a portion of the taxes it raises to rebuild the local economy and cover the costs of pensions and benefits the DNR and LNR are incapable of providing and that the Russian state is hard pressed to provide in its current economic difficulties.

9. Restore full control over the state border of Ukraine by the government throughout the conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after the local elections take place and should be completed after a comprehensive political settlement (local elections in the individual regions of Donetsk and Luhansk on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) by the end of 2015, subject to paragraph 11 of these Measures – in consultation and agreement with the representatives of individual regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in the framework of the Tripartite Liaison Group. 

According to this clause, the Ukrainian state can gain control of its side of its border with Russia only after it cedes control of territory in a “comprehensive political settlement”, including a constitutional guarantee of these regions’ self rule, and only then no sooner than the end of 2015. By which time the DNR and LNR will have consolidated their control right up to the border they are supposed to cede control of to the Ukrainian state?

10. The withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

On the day these present Package of Measures was agreed Russia moved more heavy armour across the border towards Debaltseve. The OSCE by its own admission is incapable of monitoring and verifying implementation of this clause. The border with Russia will by these Measures stay open and unsupervised by the Ukrainian state until the end of 2015.

11. A constitutional reform in Ukraine with the entry into force by the end of 2015 of a new constitution, intended as a key element of decentralization (taking into account the characteristics of individual areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, as agreed with representatives of these areas), as well as the adoption of the permanent law on the special status of the individual areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in accordance with the measures specified below in Note [1], by the end of 2015. (See note.)

First, the adoption of a new constitution in a democracy is the prerogative of the people, not of their leaders. A national leader agreeing to a new constitution in the course of negotiations with foreign powers makes a mockery of the principle of popular sovereignty.

The Note below discloses the full weight of this constitutional commitment. It shows that Poroshenko has promised to the DNR and LNR (but to no other part of the country) a wide ranging special status within Ukraine that will include their own armed forces, public prosecutor, courts, exemption from Ukrainian national law, active support for the development of close relations with neighbouring Russian provinces (but no reciprocal commitment to the substantial Ukrainian minority living in those Russian provinces) and the active and substantial material support of the central state for their socio-economic and cultural development.

All that is missing here is the full right to form their own foreign policy, for some such right is already partially granted with respect to their relations with the Russian Federation.

12. Matters relating to local elections will be discussed and agreed with the individual regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in the framework of the Tripartite Liaison Group. Elections will be held in compliance with the relevant standards of the OSCE, with monitoring by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

This clause recognises an enhanced right of the DNR and LNR to determine how elections to government of their regions will take place, and gives representatives of the Russian Federation and the OSCE in the Tripartite Group a role in the process as well.

13. To intensify the activities of the Tripartite Liaison Group, including through the establishment of working groups to implement the relevant aspects of the Minsk Agreement. These working groups will reflect the composition of the Tripartite Liaison Group.

The Russian state, alongside the Ukrainian state, the DNR, LNR and the multilateral OSCE, becomes a permanent party to the ongoing resolution of this conflict.

The Note:

Such measures, in accordance with the Law “On a special order of local government in some areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,” will include the following:

– Exemption from punishment, harassment or discrimination of individuals associated with the events that took place in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– The right to linguistic self-determination;

– Participation of local governments in the appointment of public prosecutors and courts in the affected areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– The possibility for the central executive authorities to conclude with the relevant local authorities an agreement on the economic, social and cultural development of individual areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– The State shall support the socio-economic development of individual areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– Assistance from the central government for cross-border cooperation of individual areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with regions of the Russian Federation;

– The creation of people’s militia units on the decision of local councils in order to maintain public order in the affected areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– The powers of local council deputies and officers elected in pre-term elections called by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine according to this law cannot be terminated.

The document was signed by the participants of the Tripartite Liaison Group:

Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini

The second President of Ukraine LD Kuchma

Ambassador of the Russian Federation, Ukraine MU Zurabov

AV Zakharchenko

IV Plotnitsky

The Presidents of France, Ukraine, Russia and the German Chancellor also adopted a declaration of support for the implementation of the Package of Measures to Implement the Minsk Accords.

We’re in the army now?

The recruitment campaign to the Ukrainian armed forces is is going considerably worse this year than it did last year. The reasons for this, according to Yuriy Butusov writing in Zerkalo tyzhnia (http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/hto-zrivaye-mobilizaciyu-v-ukrayini-_.html) are the following:

1. At least 50 percent of the posts in the state administration at the oblast, city and district levels remain unfilled. The state administration “vertical”, whose members are appointed directly by the President, shares responsibility with armed forces commissars for recruitment.
2. The armed forces commissars “are massively infected with corruption and incompetence”. In an effort to address these problems defense minister Stepan Poltorak has ordered that wounded veterans of the ATO campaign be appointed as commissars. So far only two have been appointed. Many commissariat posts remain unfilled. There is no monitoring of the characteristics and quality of recruits nor reporting of such incidents as drunkenness and insubordination in the ranks.
3. The armed forces are responsible for identifying who should be conscripted, but they don’t have an adequate data base nor even sufficient computers to establish and operate such a data base. All such information is on paper.This makes it impossible for the armed forces general staff to select, equip and train specialised units for front line operations, even though there are thousands of soldiers and officiers who have already had active service in war fighting and peace keeping operations and have received additional training in the armed forces of Ukraine’s western allies.
4. Contract soldiers’ pay, last set in 2012, has been seriously eroded by inflation. Although premier Yatseniuk and president Poroshenko have both stated that soldiers fighting in the ATO zone will be paid 1000 UAH 0 (65 euros) a day, this amount does not yet figure in the current pay scales approved by the government.
5. The Ukrainian state does not have an up-to-date military doctrine and strategy of defense, even though it will soon be a year since the war broke out. Without such a doctrine and strategy, it is difficult to define the specific recruitment , training and equipment needs of the armed forces.
6. The structure of the armed forces of Ukraine is ineffective and unsuited to war fighting. There are 1,400 different military units, but less than 100 of these are combat units; the rest are auxiliary and support units. Of the 300,000 personnel in the Ministry of Defense, 230,000 are soldiers, but less than 70,000 of them – i.e. about 30% – have seen any combat in the ATO zone since April last year. More than half of those recruited have been assigned to support units for the ATO or fighting units that have not yet been in combat.
7. Russia’s State Duma passed a law in January that permits foreigners to serve in its armed forces. There is no such provision in Ukrainian law, and so volunteers from abroad, with the exception of a few who were granted Ukrainian citizenship, fight in Ukrainian units without legal status or rights under law.
8. Military training is inadequate. Recruits are not taught elementary tactics, nor even to shoot properly. Independent training by recruits themselves is prohibited. As a result soldiers go into battle lacking confidence in their individual and collective abilities, their capacity for initiative in the field, etc. While in training recruits have little, if any, ammunition to practice with. Once they are in combat situations they receive plenty of it. However, they haven’t been trained in its proper use and so at the slightest panic they shoot off all their ammunition aimlessly “into the white sky”.

Yuriy Batusov concludes his article with the most serious shortcoming, to his mind, of the armed forces and the current mobilisation:

“This is the problem of trust in the authorities and the military leadership. No independent experts, nor even parliamentary control, were involved in the development of this mobilisation. Some officials, especially in the General Staff, treat their area of responsibility like a feudal fiefdom. This is not just my own subjective thinking – its the common position of all foreign military experts and NATO experts who for almost a year have been trying unsuccessfully to build an effective co-ordination between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense.

The people require a professional approach to the resolution of the problems of state, a professional government authority. And so, when we talk about the failure of this mobilisation, every politician and every general has to confront the reasons for it, one on one – with themselves in front of the mirror.”